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Introduction 
 Farmers, in India, often lack capital for investment in agriculture that is so very vital 
for improving their agricultural production. This paucity of capital flow perforce makes them 
seek loans from money lending sharks at exorbitant rates of interest and often this debt-trap 
reduces them to penury. It becomes difficult for the farmers to come out of this debt-trap even 
when faced with a favourable season and a good harvest. The problem stands compounded 
and further exacerbated when farmers look forward to taking advantage of modern high 
yielding seed technology and absorbing newer methods of scientific farming which require 
both working capital and investment capital. Technological innovations and 
commercialization of agriculture have not only increased capital requirements of farmers but 
they are also seen as responsible for necessitating and increasing the demand for superior 
inputs. In this scenario, a large segment of cultivators, particularly small and marginal 
farmers, are not able to make additional capital investments in agriculture to reap the benefits 
of the green revolution due to low surplus income accruing to them. The adequacy and timely 
availability of credit have always played a crucial role in enabling the farmers to shift over to 
a technologically superior production frontier and, consequently in realizing higher 
productivity.  
 In the present milieu, commercialization of agriculture coupled with increasing 
requirement of credit have put a lot of onus on various agricultural financial institutions to 
play a pivotal role in meeting the increasing capital needs of the farmers and in ensuring 
timely supply of various inputs besides providing other service facilities. The diversification 
of agriculture over the years has further accentuated the need for the rapid development of 
rural infrastructure and larger flow of credit to farming community (Shivamaggi, 2000). As 
for the credit delivery, the entire rural finance not only encompasses credit to farming 
community but also the development of various farming and non-farming sectors of the 
economy. In general, commercial banks (CBs), Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) and credit 
cooperatives are the major financial institutions that provide credit to the agricultural sector at 
the village level. These together with Land Development Banks (LDBs) constitute the rural 
financial institutions (RFIs) of India. The cooperatives account for 44 per cent share in the 
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rural credit flow for agriculture and 31 per cent in rural deposits in terms of network, 
coverage and outreach (Gulati and Bathla, 2002). The statistics reported by Shivamaggi 
(2000) also reveal 45 per cent share of cooperatives in total rural credit. The remaining share 
in total rural credit delivery is reported to be accounted for by commercial banks with the role 
of RRBs and LDBs being only marginal. Although the role of RFIs in credit delivery has 
become crucial in more recent times, particularly in the changed market conditions, the point 
that merits attention is how far these credit institutions will be effective in sustaining the 
reforms sweeping the financial sector and in coming up trumps against competition from 
other players as they may not have level playing reserved areas for their operations any more. 
 In fact, the entire decade of 1990s was full of discussion on the positive and negative 
impacts of financial sector reforms and their implications for the agricultural sector. In the era 
of financial sector reforms, sustainability, viability and operational efficiency of RFIs are the 
major issues that need to be taken cognisance of in ensuring effective rural credit delivery 
system. However, the major problems plaguing the efficiency of rural credit delivery system 
are the mounting overdue1 and Non Performing Assets (NPAs)2 of RFIs. The overdue 
problem of different entities of rural credit delivery structure is reported to be an all pervasive 
phenomenon that cuts across these different agencies (Puhazhendi and Jayaraman, 1999). As 
per the estimates reported by Gulati and Bathla (2002), not only the outstanding loans of 
various RFIs operating in India grew significantly but the overdue of these financial 
institutions had increased considerably during the period between 1980 and 1998 (Table 1). 
The RRBs, in particular, showed maximum increase in their outstanding loans, followed by 
CBs. The primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) and LDBs in comparison showed the 
lowest increase in their outstanding loans. Notably, the deposit mobilization of these credit 
institutions also grew significantly over the course of time. Further, while the nineties’ period 
(1990-1998) was marked with higher growth in outstanding loans for the cooperatives as 
compared to eighties’ period (1980-1989), the outstanding loans of RRBs were found to 
decline substantially in latter period as compared to the former. 
 Among various states of India, the RFIs of Maharashtra are reported to show the 
highest amount of overdues and outstanding loans over the past one decade (Gulati and 
Bathla, 2002). Even the proportion of overdues to outstanding loan of RFIs are substantially 
high in this state. According to Gulati and Bathla (2002), the proportion of overdue to 
outstanding loans of RFIs was more than 30 per cent in Maharashtra during 1997. The other 
states that fall in the category of above 30 per cent overdue as proportion of loans outstanding 
of their RFIs are Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Tripura. 
One can observe several weaknesses insofar as the working of RFIs in Maharashtra is 
concerned. One of the earlier studies conducted in cooperative sector of Maharashtra has 
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clearly shown better financial health for the institutions at the district level as compared to the 
primary or grass root level (Shah, 2001). It is not the cooperatives alone but there are several 
rural financial institutions that are beset   with similar plethora of deficiencies that impede 
their efficient functioning. This necessitates a relook at the performance of various 
agricultural financial institutions operating in Maharashtra with a view to recommending, 
designing and framing appropriate policies to rejuvenate the existing rural credit delivery in 
this state. 
Table 1: Deposits, Direct Loans Outstanding and Overdues of Loans for the  Cooperatives,  
               RRBs, LDBs and CBs of India From 1980 to 1998 
(Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Particulars/Year 1980-81 1985-86 1989-90 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 
Deposits         
CBs 37988 85404 - - - - - - 
RRBs 336 1714 4150 8826.51 11150.01 14187.9 18032.01 22189.23 
PACS 291 653 1284 2979 2928 4555.47 2322.53 - 
LDBs 20 30 - 111 122 158 163 207 
Total 38635 87801 5434 11916.51 14200.1 18901.37 20517.54 22396.23 
Loans Outstanding         
CBs 2326.4 7997.84 15313.29 - - - 25279.55 26903.01 
RRBs 385.25 1747.27 3503.78 5219.7 6258.2 7470.5 8668.9 9860.61 
PACS 2622.0 4419.85 6696 9399.3 9992.44 13609.1 10771.22 18175 
LDBs 1697.08 2655.52 3899.21 5916.25 6816.38 6856.59 8015.88 9182 
Total 7030.73 16820.48 29412.28 20535.25 23067.02 27936.19 52735.55 64120.62 
Overdues         
CBs 727.02 1743.65 3625.52 - - - 5378.81 5678.8 
RRBs 68.11 437.08 1140.18 1850.3 1765.4 1979.5 2085.6 - 
PACS 1086.39 1859.66 2986.8 3160.78 3605.32 5142.39 4125.38 - 
LDBs 242.6 260.77 803.2 683.08 713.93 915.44 1024.92 1230.97 
Total 2124.12 4301.16 8555.7 5694.16 6084.65 8037.33 12614.71 6909.77 
% age of Overdue to 
Demand 
        
CBs 47 43 51.16 42.33 40.55 38.01 36.69 33.88 
RRBs 48 51 - 53.77 49.02 44.90 42.90 39.46 
PACS 43 41 - - 31.42 33.74 35.72 35 
LDBs 46 45 - 43 38 39 39 40 
% age of Overdue to 
Loan Outstanding 
        
CBs 31.25 21.80 23.68 - - - 21.28 21.11 
RRBs 17.68 25.02 32.54 35.45 28.21 26.50 24.06 - 
PACS 41.43 42.08 44.61 33.63 36.08 37.79 38.30 - 
LDBs 14.30 9.82 20.60 11.55 10.47 13.35 12.79 13.41 
Total 30.21 25.57 29.09 27.73 26.38 28.77 23.92 10.78 
 
Source: Gulati, Ashok and Seema Bathla (2002), ‘Institutional Credit to Indian Agriculture: Defaults and  Policy 
Options’, Occasional Paper – 23, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Mumbai.      
 
 The major foci of attention of this paper are on not only to review the rural credit 
scenario of Maharashtra but also to provide a brief overview on the rural banking sector 
reforms in general and on the reform initiatives in cooperative sector in particular. The entire 
paper is divided into two sections. While the first section brings into focus the rural banking 
sector reforms and reform initiatives in cooperative sector, the second section is chiefly 
devoted to the evaluation of rural finance in the state of Maharashtra. 
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Section I 
Rural Banking Sector Reforms 
 The development of rural credit delivery system had three distinct phases. While the 
first phase (1904-1969) encompassed the monopoly of the credit cooperatives, the second 
phase (1969-1991) was marked with the induction of the commercial banks into the rural 
credit delivery system through their nationalisation in 1969 and the setting up of the RRBs all 
over the country in 1975 with a view to provide low cost banking facilities to the weaker 
sections of the society (Puhazhendi and Jayaraman, 1999). The third phase, concomitant with 
the introduction of financial sector reforms, is characterized by the transformation of credit 
institutions into organizationally strong, financially viable and operationally efficient units. 
The emphasis of the financial sector reforms is on ensuring financial health of the rural credit 
delivery system. It is being conceded by Puhazhendi and Jayaraman (1999) that the 
innovations in rural credit delivery have a favourable impact on agricultural production and in 
reduction of poverty mainly due to increased flow of credit to farming community. They also 
assert that with the acceleration in the pace of capital formation, rural infrastructure 
development will see a new pace and much of this effort will be directed and focused on 
establishing cool chains and in networking transportation and marketing channels which in 
turn will allow more productive and increasing amount of credit absorption from financial 
institutions. 
 It is reckoned that the planning process of our country is primarily aimed at ensuring 
access to credit in rural areas. Besides, it also stands at augmenting agricultural production 
and alleviating rural poverty, in addition to improving the efficiency of the rural credit 
delivery system. Although various measures initiated under the planning process have greatly 
improved the reach of credit institutions and been instrumental in alleviating poverty in the 
country, the emerging segmentation of the rural credit markets in the face of financial sector 
reforms unleashed under the changing post - WTO economic scenario, has brought forth 
newer challenges before the rural credit delivery system. The reform process not only seeks 
to minimize government controls on credit institutions but also imposes stringent accounting 
norms and gives freedom to banks from mandatory rural lending. However, in their wake, 
they may also create conditions not auguring well for rural development, especially for the 
vulnerable sections of the society. In general, as indicated by Mujumdar (1996), the reform 
process in the banking sector encompasses the deregulation of interest rates, dismantling of 
directed credit, besides improving the functioning of capital markets, including the 
government securities’ market. However, it is being conceded by Mujumdar (1996) that the 
reform package in rural banking sector has adversely affected the priority sector, especially in 
the area of interest rates since the new interest rate structure has become highly regressive 
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and biased against priority sector. Although the Approach Paper to the Ninth Plan (1997-
2002) has accorded high priority to activities relating to agriculture and rural development, 
the credit policy is yet to meet to the Ninth Plan priorities and initiatives. At this juncture, the 
point that merits attention is: what ingredients need to be added to the credit policy to make 
the rural credit delivery system more effective and efficient. 
 Notably, the new policy regime does not play heed to several areas of rural 
infrastructure. For instance, while the rural infrastructure development fund (RIDF) of the 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) is helping infrastructure 
projects to a considerable extent, there is hardly any attention given in new policy package 
vis-à-vis certain other concurrent issues such as the development of brand names for 
agricultural products, development of water saving technology and cold storage facilities, 
besides packaging activities, etc., which also merit attention (Shivamaggi, 2000). With a view 
to achieve overall rural development, Shivamaggi (2000) lays emphasis on the need to 
introduce employment oriented programmes in the rural credit policy such as waste land 
development and watershed planning. In general, Shivamaggi (2000) admits that the policy 
makers are yet to arrive at a banking structure and operational system that suits the credit and 
saving needs of agriculturists’ and at the same time promotes agriculture.  
Reforms in Cooperative sector 
 Although  the reforms in the banking sector have been initiated in commercial banks 
much earlier (beginning 1991-92), the reform process in cooperatives have taken much longer 
time in initiation on account of certain limitations, viz., the need for generating a consensus 
among the various State Governments which govern and control cooperative credit 
institutions and the need to balance the interests of very many diversified groups which 
control, operate and guide the cooperatives. However, despite these limitations, a few major 
reforms have been introduced in the cooperative credit sector. The policy reforms in the 
cooperative credit sector have been outlined and examined by Subrahmanyam (1999).3 While 
examining reforms in the cooperative credit sector, he not only delves into the positive and 
negative effects of the policy reforms but also suggests some new steps that need to be 
initiated to truly restructure and bolster the cooperative credit sector in the country. Earlier, 
Gadgil (1994) had delved into the future likely impact of financial sector reforms on the 
formal agricultural credit system. Thus, the economic viability and successful and efficient 
functioning of cooperatives have been the raison-d-etre of a generation of economists, 
especially in the aftermath of the dawn of liberalization era and consequent changes in the 
economic scenario. 
 Of late, the withdrawal of the Government regulations from many spheres of 
economic and business activities has enabled the use of cooperatives as an institutional set up 
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for implementing the programmes relating to socio-economic development. The new 
economic policies are expected to usher in a host of such those favourable conditions as 
autonomy, freedom with greater accountability and changes in cooperative laws, that will 
eventually lead to a gradual freeing of the cooperatives. The cooperative sector in the 
changed economic scenario has better opportunities for expanding and diversifying its 
business operations relating to farm and non-farm activities in agriculture. However, some 
quarters fear that unhindered unleashing of market forces will subject the cooperatives to 
unequal competition from the private sector with no patronizing support forthcoming from  
the Government for their growth and development. Nonetheless, experts also concede greater 
growth opportunities for the non-credit cooperative organizations, especially those which are 
as large in their size and market reach as any of the private or multinational firms.  
 Insofar as the development of cooperatives in new economic environment is 
concerned, one of the arguments of Shivamaggi (2000) is not in favour of leaving the 
cooperatives alone to face up the challenges of market forces since they still require 
government support in their lending business and deposit mobilization. In fact, the weakness 
of cooperative banking lies at the primary level. In majority of the states neither the deposit 
mobilization nor the borrowing membership of PACS is high. For instance, during 1996-97 
the borrowing membership was less than a fourth of the total membership in Uttar Pradesh 
(20 per cent), Karnataka (17 per cent), Assam (0.20 per cent), and Maharashtra (24 per cent). 
Even in Andhra Pradesh, which initiated steps to restructure cooperatives, the proportion of 
borrowing members was only 29 per cent. The average loan business per primary society was 
less than Rs.5 lakhs in West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, UP, Maharashtra, AP and Karnataka. 
Thus, in general, PACS in India have shown a dismal picture. It is to be noted that while 
some of the states like Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Bihar, Rajasthan, etc. have 
modified their cooperative laws, certain other states like Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and 
Maharashtra are yet to follow suit and initiate changes in their cooperative laws (Elumalai, 
1999). The need of the hour is to truly restructure cooperatives throughout the country. This 
requires rewriting of the cooperative legislation on the basis of a model law to be enunciated, 
formulated, and legislated by the Government if India.  
 The future course of action should be to enable PACS to transform themselves into 
full-fledged rural banks in order to cater to all types of productive and investment credits at 
the village level. Further, the role of Government should be that of a facilitator. The 
Government should (i) provide incentives and disincentives through financial and other 
means and establish a primary cooperative development fund for this purpose; (ii) monitor 
the societies and check undesirable trends; (iii) audit the societies’ accounts to ensure proper 
financial management; (iv) promote professionalism in the cooperatives; and (v) encourage a 
 7
politics-free cooperative leadership by barring politicians from participation in the 
management of the cooperatives (Shivamaggi, 1996, 2000). Yet another suggestion of 
Shivamaggi (2000) is in favour of drastically cutting down the role of registrar of 
cooperatives and redefining this role in accordance with the obtainable situation and standard 
of operations. 
 The conditions created by the new economic policies such as ushering in of 
autonomy, freedom with greater accountability and changes in cooperative laws are certainly 
steps in the right direction for the growth and gradual freeing of the cooperative sector. Now, 
how efficiently and quickly the cooperatives learn the ropes of market economy and are able 
to compete with other sectors of the economy will depend on their inherent competitive 
strengths, cutting edge technological mite and productive capabilities. 
Section II 
Rural Credit Scenario of Maharashtra 
 This section provides an insight into the rural credit scenario of Maharashtra with a 
major foci of attention on annual credit plans (ACP), potential linked credit plans (PLCP), 
progress of various RFIs over time, distributional aspect of credit, micro-finance   or linkage 
of bank credit with various self-help groups, etc. The basic idea of this section is to highlight, 
in general, the functioning of various agricultural financial institutions in Maharashtra with a 
specific focus on credit cooperatives, commercial banks, RRBs and LDBs. 
ACP and PLCP Outlays 
 The State Level Bankers’ Committee (SLBC)4 generally prepares ACP for each 
district with a view to achieve overall development of various sectors and regions of the state. 
However, before formulating district level credit plans, block level credit plans are prepared 
taking into account the village surveys conducted by each of the bank branches, especially 
with respect to cropping pattern of the area, exploitatable potential and demand for credit for 
various activities. The purpose of this exercise is to achieve a balanced growth of various 
sectors/regions with a view to improve the socio-economic conditions of rural poor and 
artisans and, in general, helping the agricultural sector as a whole. Monitoring and evaluation 
of these plans are done periodically by the Block Level Bankers’ Committee (BLBC), 
District Level Bankers’ Committee (DLBC) and also by the SLBC. However, major guidance 
with respect to successful implementation of the credit plan is being ensured by the RBI, 
NABARD, Government of India and other apex institutions. 
 The estimates relating to ACP show substantially high share (56 per cent) of 
agriculture and allied activities in total credit plan outlay for the state of Maharashtra with 
activities relating to small scale industries (SSI) and non farm sectors (NFS) showing the 
least share in this respect (Table 2). The other priority sectors are seen to account for 14 per 
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cent and non-priority sectors about 22 per cent share in total credit plan outlay of the state. 
The other priority sectors such as transport, retail trade, housing, education, consumption, etc. 
also show a sharp increase in their allocations in total credit plan outlay during 2000-01 over 
that of the reference year 1999-2000.  
Table 2: Annual Credit Plan Outlays for Different Regions of Maharashtra 
(Amount in Crore Rs.) 
Regions (2000-01) 
Particulars Western 
Maharashtra 
Vidarbha Marathwada Konkan Maharashtra State 
1. Agriculture & Allied Activities 2478.75 
(59.34) 
716.89 
(53.09) 
1073.39 
(68.36) 
178.31 
(19.56) 
4447.34 
(55.53) 
    Of which 
     - Crop Loans 
1562.12 452.28 852.00 46.92 2913.32 
2. SSI / NFS 337.40 
(8.08) 
70.71 
(5.24) 
103.00 
(6.56) 
158.37 
(17.38) 
669.48 
(8.36) 
3. Other Priority Sector 437.09 
(10.46) 
256.94 
(19.03) 
175.82 
(11.20) 
245.62 
(26.95) 
1115.47 
(13.93) 
4. Total Priority Sector  3253.45 
(77.89) 
1044.52 
(77.35) 
1352.21 
(86.12) 
582.30 
(63.89) 
6232.48 
(77.82) 
     Of which 
- Employment Guarantee  and Poverty   
   Alleviation   Programme  
317.47 227.17 133.02 106.28 783.94 
5. Non Priority Sector 923.60 
(22.11) 
305.91 
(22.65) 
217.95 
(13.88) 
329.19 
(36.11) 
1776.65 
(22.18) 
         Grand Total (4+5) 4176.94 1350.43 1570.13 911.46 8008.96 
Per cent Increase in 2000-01 over 1999-2000 
1. Agriculture & Allied Activities 17.27 13.09 22.58 31.47 18.32 
    Of which 
     - Crop Loans 
15.64 15.24 24.59 15.45 18.05 
2. SSI / NFS 2.42 -0.45 20.33 4.45 4.99 
3. Other Priority Sector 28.23 14.12 26.39 47.85 28.03 
4. Total Priority Sector  16.86 12.30 22.89 28.43 18.31 
     Of which 
- Employment Guarantee  and Poverty   
   Alleviation   Programme  
20.49 24.61 18.00 9.71 19.61 
5. Non Priority Sector -1.67 17.99 39.07 6.94 6.83 
         Grand Total (4+5) 12.18 13.54 24.90 19.74 15.55 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from ‘Maharashtra State Annual Credit Plan’,  
             Bank of Maharashtra, Mumbai, 2000-2001. 
Notes: i)  Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total plan outlay for the district/state. 
          ii) (a) Agriculture and Allied Activities include minor irrigation, energisation programme, land            
development, dry land agriculture, farm mechanization, plantation and horticulture, sericulture, fodder 
cultivation, animal husbandry, fisheries, forestry and waste land development, storage  operations, 
non-conventional energy, seed project, etc. (b) Non-farm Sector (NFS)/ Small Scale Industries (SSI) 
include handloom/ Powerloom, tiny sector, rural cottage and village industries, rural Artisans, agro-
processing, etc. (c) Other Priority Sectors include transport operations, retail trade small business, 
professional and self employed, educational loans, housing loans,  consumption loans, etc. 
 
Crop loans are seen to account for nearly two thirds share in total ACP outlay for 
agriculture and allied activities. Among various regions, the Western Maharashtra shows the 
highest share (52.15 per cent) in total credit plan outlay of the state, followed by Marathwada 
(19.60 per cent), Vidarbha (16.86 per cent), and Konkan (11.38 per cent) regions. 
Interestingly, Konkan region shows the least share (20 per cent) for agriculture and allied 
activities, whereas non-priority sectors show as high as 36 per cent share in total credit plan 
 9
outlay for this region. Nonetheless, in the case of Konkan region too priority sectors have 
accounted for the highest share (64 per cent) in total credit plan outlay, which is mainly due 
to relatively higher share in credit plan outlay for other priority sectors. However, the 
allocations in total credit plan outlay for various sectors are seen to be as per the RBI 
guidelines.5 In general, except for Konkan region, all other regions of Maharashtra have 
shown higher allocations for agriculture and allied activities. Such increased allocations in 
plan outlay is a reflection of the importance of agriculture in Government’s overall policy 
encompassing priority sector. 
The estimates relating to PLCP outlays encompassing various sectors/activities show 
that among various regions Western Maharashtra alone accounts for around 50 per cent share 
in total PLCP outlay for the state of Maharashtra (Table 3). The next important regions are 
Marathwada and Vidarbha, each accounting for about 20 per cent share in state’s total PLCP 
outlay during the past five years. The allocation for Konkan region in state’s total PLCP 
outlay is the least. Thus, Western Maharashtra turns out to be the most important region since 
this region attracts the major PLCP outlay of the state. Further, though, in general, there has 
been nearly two folds rise in PLCP outlays of all the regions of Maharashtra during the period 
between 1997-98 and 2001-02, the rates of growth/increases in these outlays are relatively 
faster for Vidarbha and Konkan regions as compared to Western Maharashtra and 
Marathwada regions during the same period. The PLCP estimates are available for 21 
diversified activities with activities relating crop loans, non farm sector, other priority sector, 
minor irrigation and farm mechanization put together accounting for around 80 per cent share 
in state’s total PLCP outlay. 
Table 3: Potential Linked Credit Plan (PLCP) Estimates of Exploitable Potential for  
                  Different Regions of Maharashtra 
                                                                                            (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Regions Year Western Maharashtra Vidarbha Marathwada Konkan 
Maharashtra 
State 
1997-98 2552.87 (50.66) 912.67 (18.11) 1159.36 (23.00) 414.87 (8.23) 5039.77 
1998-99 3066.47 (50.48) 1134.27 (18.67) 1353.86 (22.29) 519.59 (8.56) 6074.19 
1999-2000 3577.54 (50.17) 1361.47 (19.09) 1556.79 (21.83) 635.51 (8.91) 7131.31 
2000-01 4210.38 (50.21) 1624.02 (19.37) 1784.27 (21.28) 766.43 (9.14) 8385.10 
2001-02 4945.71 (50.18) 1937.79 (19.66) 2048.29 (20.78) 925.13 (9.38) 9856.92 
Source:  Compiled from Official records, NABARD office, Pune. 
Notes:  i) Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total potential linked credit plan for the state.            
ii) The activities for which the PLCP estimates are available include: Minor Irrgation and                 
Energisation (MI), Land Development (LD), Dry Land Farming (DLF), Farm                
Mechanization (FM), Plantation & Horticulture (P&H), Sericulture (SERI), Animal                 
Husbandry-Dairy (AH-D), Animal Husbandry-Poultry (AH-P), Animal Husbandry-Sheep, 
Goat and Poultry (AH-SGP), Inland Fishery (FISH-INL), Brakish Water Prawn (BRAKISH), 
Marine Fishery (FISH-MAR), Forestry/Waste Land Development (FORWL), Storage 
Godowns-Market Yard (SGMY), Non-Conventional Energy (NCES), Non-Farm Sector (NFS), 
Other Priority Sectors (OPRSEC), Crop: Crop Loan, Working Capital (WC), Self Help Groups 
(SHGs). 
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   In fact, in the state of Maharashtra, the diversification of agriculture over the years 
has accentuated the need for the rapid development of rural infrastructure and a larger flow of 
credit. Various credit cooperatives, commercial banks and RRBs are by far the major 
financial institutions engaged in meeting the capital requirements for diversified activities and 
developing the farming/rural sector of the state. Besides, LDBs are also playing a crucial role 
in meeting the increasing capital needs of the farmers of this state. Although there has been 
multi-agency set-up for rural banking, the major institutional finance to farming community 
in Maharashtra comes from commercial banks and credit cooperatives. 
 
Cooperative Bank Finances 
Two types of set-up, viz. one short term and the other medium term, constitute the 
credit cooperative structure in Maharashtra. A 3-tier system is central to the structure of both 
the short term and the medium term credit cooperatives. This 3-tire system consists of a Co-
operative apex bank at the state level, Central Co-operative banks at the district level and of 
Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies (PACS) at the village level. The three tier 
set-up is not only meeting the credit requirements of the farmers for seasonal agricultural 
operations (crop loans) but also investing on farm assets that do not entail huge capital outlay. 
The long term co-operative credit is extended by a two-tier set-up with the Maharashtra State 
Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (MSCARDB) operating at the state 
level and a network of Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Banks 
(PCARDBs) or Urban Banks at taluka level. Though creation of farm assets is the basic 
objective of extending long term credit cooperative finance, it also helps the farmers in 
improving their farms on a permanent basis so that they have a commercially viable farm in 
the long run and a perennial farm enterprise. As on June, 2000, there were 20,529 PACS with 
a membership of 108.90 lakh and 407 PCARDBs in June 1995 having a membership of 69.33 
lakhs in the state of Maharashtra. Although there has been substantial increase in the 
membership of credit cooperatives in the state of Maharashtra, the trend over the last two 
decades in terms of cooperative finances is not very encouraging in this state, especially in 
more recent times.  
 The trend over the past two decades show a slower growth in institutional finance 
through credit cooperatives during the decade of economic reforms (1991-2000) as against 
the decade preceding it (1980-1990). Not only this, the reform period is also seen to be 
marked with a slower growth in membership of credit cooperatives in Maharashtra (Table 4). 
On the other hand, the outstanding loans of these cooperatives have grown at much faster rate 
as compared to their loan advances during both pre-and post economic reform periods. 
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Table 4: Cooperative Bank Finances in Maharashtra; 1980-2000 
                                                                                    (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Cooperative Banks 
No. of Coop. Inst./Soc. No. of Members (‘000’) Loan Advances Outstanding Loansl 
Period 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
A
pe
x 
PA
C
S 
To
ta
l 
TE 1982/83 31 18565 18596 1109 5595 6704 3318 288 3606 1507 431 1938 
TE 1990/91 34 19694 19728 1523 7910 9433 9298 929 10227 4811 1521 6332 
TE 1999/00 34 20378 20412 1340 10432 11772 22195 2280 24475 15274 3456 18730 
CGR (%) 
- 1980-90 
- 1991-00 
- 1980-00 
 
1.33 
- 
0.37 
 
-0.03NS 
0.48 
0.65 
 
-0.03NS 
0.48 
0.65 
 
1.01NS 
-1.91 
1.65 
 
4.90 
3.48 
3.35 
 
4.33 
2.72 
3.15 
 
14.47NS 
7.12 
8.64 
 
13.64 
9.36 
12.93 
 
14.08NS 
9.74 
10.76 
 
23.97NS 
13.52 
14.57 
 
12.59 
9.07 
12.92 
 
18.50 
12.98 
14.64 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Economic Survey of  
              Maharashtra’  
Notes: 1) CGR = Compound Growth Rates 
           2) All growth rates significant at 1 per cent level of probability 
           3) NS: Growth rates not significant at 1 per cent level of probability 
           4) Apex institutions include SCBs and DCCBs 
 
 The institutional finance through credit cooperatives in Maharashtra stood at 
Rs.3,606 crores during TE 1982/83, which increased to Rs.10,227 crores by TE 1990/91 and 
further to Rs.24,475 crores by TE 1999/00. On the other hand, the outstanding loans of these 
credit cooperatives increased from Rs.1,938 crores during TE 1982/83 to Rs.18,730 crores by 
TE 1999/00. Thus, it can be seen that the outstanding loans of these credit cooperatives have 
grown very close to their loan advances by the TE 1999/00. This is mainly because of faster 
growth in outstanding loans of these credit cooperatives as compared to their loan advances 
during the period between 1980 and 2000. Nonetheless, like slower growth in loan advances 
during the decade of economic reform, the outstanding loans of these credit cooperatives in 
Maharashtra have also slowed down during this period as compared to the period before the 
economic reforms. 
 Another interesting feature of credit cooperatives, particularly of PACS in 
Maharashtra, is the increasing trend in their share of medium and long term (MT &LT) 
advances and decline in their share of short term (ST) advances (Table 5). At the same time, 
the MT and LT outstanding loans have also grown over time in Maharashtra. The share of ST 
in total loan advances of PACS in Maharashtra has steadily declined from 82 per cent during 
TE 1985 to 76 per cent by the TE 2000. Contrary to this, the share of MT in total loan 
advances of PACS in Maharashtra has grown from around 17 per cent to nearly 22 per cent 
during the same period. Similarly, the share of LT in total loan advances of PACS in this state 
has grown from 0.86 per cent during TE 1985 to 4.71 per cent by TE 1990 with a decline in 
the same in the subsequent periods. 
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Table 5: Progress of PACS According to Type of Loan Advances, Recover and  
               Outstanding Loans in Maharashtra                                     (Amount in Crores Rupees) 
Loan Advances Recovery Outstanding Loan Period ST MT  LT Total ST MT LT Total ST MT LT Total 
TE 1985 280 
(81.79) 
59 
(17.35) 
3 
(0.86) 
342 255 
(87.75) 
34 
(11.85) 
1 
(0.40) 
290 381 
(72.23) 
140 
(26.53) 
7 
(1.24) 
528 
TE 1990 594 
(72.67) 
185 
(22.63) 
38 
(4.71) 
817 485 
(77.85) 
114 
(18.32) 
24 
(3.83) 
623 739 
(61.97) 
388 
(32.58) 
65 
(5.45) 
1192 
TE 1995 790 
(80.51) 
162 
(16.55) 
29 
(2.94) 
981 656 
(82.51) 
124 
(15.64) 
15 
(1.85) 
795 1074 
(59.18) 
631 
(34.76) 
110 
(6.06) 
1815 
TE 2000 1902 
(76.05) 
543 
(21.69) 
57 
(2.26) 
2502 1567 
(81.37) 
325 
(16.90) 
33 
(1.73) 
1925 2122 
(60.09) 
1219 
(34.52) 
190 
(5.39) 
3531 
Source:  Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Co-operative Movement  
              at a Glance in Maharashtra, Office of the Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of Co- 
              operative Societies, Maharashtra State, Pune 
Notes: I) Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total 
           ii) TE: Triennium Ending; ST: Short Term; MT: Medium Term; LT: Long Term 
 
 The trends in recovery and outstanding loans of PACS in Maharashtra are similar to 
that of their loan advances, i.e., a declining share in short term recovery and outstanding loans 
of PACS in the face of an increasing trend in their share of MT and LT recovery and 
outstanding loans during the period between TE 1985 and TE 2000.  This is a pointer to the 
fact that in more recent times medium and long term loans have become the major foci of 
farm finance. Nonetheless, mention may be made here that the PACS in Maharashtra are 
beset with several deficiencies in their functioning. The deficiencies are noticed in respect of 
their law operational efficiency, high incidence of overdue, low level of recovery, 
distributional aspect of ST and MT loans, coverage of SC/ST members, etc. (Shah, 2001). 
The borrowing members per society of PACS are also reported to have come down, 
especially after the late eighties period. Further, despite Maharashtra being accounting for the 
bulk of the nation’s total production and acreage under cotton crop, the share of this crop in 
total crop loan advances of PACS is also reported to have declined perceptibly, especially in 
more recent times (Shah, 2001). Even the statistics reported by Mujumdar (2001) at all-India 
level show a decline in borrowing farmers during the period between 1990-91 and 1995-96. 
However, this statistics is reported for commercial banks. In view of several deficiencies in 
the functioning of PACS in Maharashtra, Shah (2001) has categorically emphasised upon the 
need to formulate policies and evolve schemes relating to SC/ST welfare and those affecting 
the weaker sections of the rural community. Simplification of loan procedures and making 
cohesive measures for recovery of loans of chronic and heavy defaults of influential well-to-
do borrowers who evade repayment despite their capacity to repay are some other suggestions 
extended by Shah (2001). In fact, the lackadaisical approach of PACS towards loan advances 
to SC/ST members and other weaker sections, and also for cotton crop calls for immediate 
remedial measures if Maharashtra is to continue to lead the country in the cooperative 
development. 
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Commercial Bank Finances 
Despite several targets prescribed by the RBI for Public Sector Banks (PSBs)5, these 
banks are reported to have defaulted merrily on majority of these targets (Mujumdar, 2001). 
This is evident from the fact that, during the period between 1992 and 1996, the net bank 
credit of PSBs to priority sectors at all-India level was well below 40 per cent. Not only this, 
at all-India level, the net bank credit of PSBs to agriculture and to weaker sections remained 
well below 18 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, of their total advances all through the 
period between 1991 and 2000. This is a reflection of the fact that the two sub-targets of 
credit to agriculture and to weaker sections continue to remain unattained even in more recent 
times. Thus, agriculture in general and weaker sections in particular are grossly neglected by 
PSBs. However, in view of the recommendations of the Union Budget of 1996-97, which laid 
emphasis on the need to double the size of rural credit in the subsequent five years, the RBI 
had restored the priority sector credit of PSBs to the level of 41 per cent of their total 
advances in March 1997, and it remained well above 40 per cent thereafter (Mujumdar, 
2001). 
As for institutional finance to farming community, the commercial banks in 
Maharashtra have also not shown encouraging trends. The trend over the past two decades 
shows a slower growth in rural institutional finance through commercial banks during the 
decade of economic reforms as against the pre-economic reform period (Table 6). The 
commercial banks in Maharashtra have not only shown slower growth in their loan advances 
and deposits but also decline in their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio during the period of reforms 
as against the pre-economic reform period. However, mention may be made here that though 
the rural C-D ratio of commercial banks in Maharashtra has come down from 72 per cent 
during TE 1982/83 to 65 per cent by the TE 1999/00, it is still well above the minimum 
prescribed limit of 60 per cent as stipulated by the RBI. 
 
Table 6: Rural Deposits and Credits of Commercial Banks in Maharashtra 
                                                                                                                      (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
Triennium Ending CGR (%) Indicators 1982/83 1992/93 1999/00 1980-90 1991-2000 1980-2000 
   Rural Deposits 381 1964 5145 19.05 14.40NS 16.28 
   Rural Credits 274 1457 3346 17.08 12.28NS 14.91 
         CD Ratio (%) 71.91 74.18 65.03 - - - 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Economic Survey of  
              Maharashtra’ 
 It is to be further noted that in Maharashtra the outstanding loans of indirect finances 
of commercial banks have grown at much faster pace as compared to their outstanding loans 
of direct finances to farmers (Table 7).  
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Table 7: Progress of Distribution of Outstanding Advances of Scheduled Commercial Banks  
               to Agriculture in Maharashtra Vis-à-vis India         
              (Amount in Crore Rupees) 
FDFI LEEBEW OTIF@ DFF Total Period No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO No. of Ac. AO 
Maharashtra 
1980 2649 18 1105 33 83396 90 485350 254 574500 395 (11.05) 
TE 1985 4416 11 5012 69 51141 113 906131 572 966700 765 (10.02) 
TE 1990 2458 16 176 44 20940 105 1548068 1388 1571642 1553 (10.06) 
TE 1995 4557 24 2454 212 13541 175 1577661 1819 1598212 2230 (10.10) 
TE 2000 2859 115 9256 386 21879 2241 1217692 3182 1251686 5924 (14.06) 
India 
1980 36700 206 12010 145 1085002 433 8501469 2789 9635181 3573 
TE 1985 50135 325 38119 392 639520 695 13582102 6220 14955262 7632 
TE 1990 44514 363 54823 484 606412 645 20665098 13950 21370846 15442 
TE 1995 45271 389 69127 923 314821 860 20486449 19916 20915667 22088 
TE 2000 58477 1455 71915 1589 178850 6095 16810610 33001 17119839 42140 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Statistical Tables Relating  
             to  Banks in India, Department of Banking Operations and Development for the RBI, Bombay’  
 
Note: Figures in Parentheses are shares of Maharashtra in India’s total Outstanding Loans 
         @-includes loans to farmers through Primary Credit Societies 
        FDFI: Finance for Distribution of Fertilizer and other Inputs; LSEBEW: Loans to State Electricity  
         Board for Energization of Well, etc.; OTIF: Other Types of Indirect Finance; DFF: Direct  
         Finance to Farmers; AO: Amount Outstanding 
 
Table 7 also shows an increasing trend in share of Maharashtra in total outstanding 
loans of all scheduled commercial banks of India, which has grown from 10 per cent during 
TE 1985 to as high as above 14 per cent by the TE 2000. These trends are certainly not very 
encouraging insofar as the commercial bank finances to farming community in Maharashtra 
are concerned. Despite the recommendations of the R.V. Gupta Committee, appointed in 
1997, which encompass several changes in commercial bank’s documentation, loan appraisal 
parameters, operational procedures and loan product with built-in liquid saving product, the 
rural credit delivery through commercial banks in Maharashtra has grown at lower pace, 
especially during the 1990s. 
 In order to realize high and sustained growth of GDP, Mujumdar (1998) has 
categorically emphasized upon the need for the PSBs to support priority sectors irrespective 
of whether there exist credit target or not. As regards rural credit delivery, the Ninth Plan 
Approach Paper is categorical on priority sector advances. As per Ninth Plan Approach 
Paper, “Greater credit flow will be ensured to meet the investment requirements of the 
farming community for stepping up the growth of production. Efforts will be made to ensure 
timely and adequate availability of credit, particularly to small and marginal farmers and 
tribal farmers at reasonable rates so as to enable them to make investments necessary for 
higher production”[Approach Paper to the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002), p.56, 1996]. 
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The Ninth Plan, therefore, not only recognizes the role of priority sectors in the future growth 
of the economy, but it also categorically emphasizes upon the imperative of enlarging the 
flow of credit to these sectors. Hence, one of the suggestions of Mujumdar (1998) is in favour 
of following such future credit policies which fall in line with the Ninth Plan priorities, and 
which need to be implemented without any further delay. 
Regional Rural Bank Finances 
Notably, in the wake of economic liberalization now underway in India, the banking 
sector in general and Regional Rural Banks in particular are experiencing sweeping changes. 
Although RRBs have played a predominate role in supplementing the efforts of the 
Government in eradicating poverty by dispensing credit under Government sponsored 
programmes, their erosion in profitability and the poor sustainability is causing much 
concern. The policy regime under which they performed contributed greatly to this state of 
sorry affairs. In fact, RRBs were initially set-up in India in 1975 as low cost bank with the 
prime objective of meeting the credit requirements of rural poor. Though these rural financial 
institutions have created awareness for banking practices amongst the rural masses, in course 
of time they appeared to have lost their initial image of low cost bank (Deshpande, et.al., 
1998). A review of performance of RRBs over the past one decade or so show an estimated 
aggregated  amount of loss to the tune of Rs.15.86 crores incurred by 130 RRBs in 1984-85, 
which is seen to have grown to Rs.621.00 crores incurred by 162 RRBs in 1991-92 and 
further to as high as Rs.3047.87 crores incurred by 152 RRBs in 1996-97. Due to huge 
accumulated losses and operational deficiencies, the very survival of RRBs is now at stake 
and it has become a matter of concern. In order to strengthen the organizational structure of 
RRBs, several committees were constituted from time to time.6 Among various committees, 
the recommendations of Bhandari Committee are noteworthy. This Committee had evolved a 
forward looking policy framework, which mainly revolved around: (a) comprehensive 
restructuring of select 49 RRBs including financial assistance to them, (b) Memorandum of 
Understanding between RRBs and their Sponsor Banks, (c) freedom to select 70 RRBs from 
Service Area Obligations in view of their inadequate business so as to provide them broader 
business base, (d) relocation of loss making branches and opening extension counters, (e) 
expansion and diversification of loan portfolio by allowing Non Target Group and Non 
Priority Sector and rural housing finance, (f) widening of avenues of profitable investment 
and surplus non-SLR funds, and (g) strengthening Board of Directors of RRBs by induction 
of professionals as GOI nominees (Deshpande et.al., 1998). Majority of these policies were 
seen to have emanated from the financial sector reforms initiated during 1994-95.  
 It is to be noted that considering the dismal performance of RRBs and their weak 
structure, Government of India (GOI) unleashed in the first phase its financial sector reforms 
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in 1994-95 and embarked upon an ambitious plan of revamping initially 49 out of a total of 
196 RRBs with the aim of improving their profitability besides launching several other policy 
reforms aimed at improving their functional efficiency. In the second phase, based on the 
recommendations of Basu Committee, another batch of 68 RRBs were brought under 
restructuring during 1995-96. As a result of these revamping efforts, 40 RRBs were reported 
to have shown profits (Capoor, 1998). Although various policies relating to restructuring and 
revamping of RRBs were introduced in the first and second phase of financial sector reforms, 
the policy relating to granting of permission by the RBI to RRBs to invest in  non-target 
avenues like shares and debentures of corporates, units of mutual funds, bonds of public 
sector undertakings, etc. was severely criticized by Mujumdar (2001) as this had paved the 
way for a reverse flow of funds from the rural to the urban sector. 
Undoubtedly, the major part of resources of RRBs is generated through deposits. 
Nonetheless, too much dependence on deposits and lack of attention paid to loan advances is 
certainly a disturbing phenomenon. In course of time, the RRBs in India have shown a drastic 
fall in their credit-deposit (C-D) ratio. The C-D ratio of RRBs at all-India level has come 
down from 123 per cent during 1981 to as low as 43 per cent by the TE 2000 (Table 8). The 
fall in this ratio is more sharp in the state of Maharashtra, which has come down from 148 per 
cent during 1981 to 55 per cent by the TE 2000. It is to be noted that in Maharashtra, as on 
March 2000, there were 582 branches of RRBs with Marathwada region accounting for 
around 50 per cent share in total numerical strength of these bank branches of RRBs. The 
decline in C-D ratio of RRBs is mainly due to diversion of substantial portion of their 
resources in investments instead of lending in rural areas. It should be recollected here that 
the chief objective of setting up of RRBs was the effective coverage of small and marginal 
farmers, landless labourers, rural artisans, etc. with a view to enhance their productive 
capabilities. The decline in their lending business is a clear cut reflection of deviation of 
RRBs from the objectives they were initially formed. 
Table 8: Progress of Deposit and Credit of Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) in Maharashtra Vis- 
                à-vis India                                                                              (Amount in Lakh Rupees) 
Maharashtra All-India Period Deposit Credit  CD Ratio (%) Deposit Credit  CD Ratio (%) 
1981 557 824 147.94 33147 40682 122.73 
TE 1985 1724 2034 117.40 97075 107492 110.73 
TE 1990 8851 10709 120.99 353554 321839 91.03 
TE 1995 22757 17373 76.34 861931 528835 61.35 
TE 2000 75492 41562 55.05 2685412 1152160 42.90 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Statistical Tables Relating  
             to Banks in India, Department of Banking Operations and Development for the RBI, Bombay’.  
 
 It has been asserted by Shivamaggi (2000) that the major problem faced by RRBs in 
India is the lack of staff motivation and specialization despite local recruitment of their staff. 
The poor performance of RRBs greatly owed it to their hurriedly recruited and trained staff 
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that not only lack exposure in dealing with a large number of small-term/ composite loans but 
also in terms their weak knowledge to deal with bank accounts, seek assistance and guidance 
at each stage of loan application to its recovery. One of the suggestions of Shivamaggi (2000) 
is, therefore, in favour of placing all the employees of RRBs in the rural banking cadre (RBC) 
with a view to make them employees of both the RRBs and their sponsor banks, and, hence, 
helping them to expand their career prospects, as in the case of general banks. Personal career 
growth prospects of the employees of RRBs will not only motivate them to work efficiently 
but also in terms of improving the overall viability of these rural financial institutions. 
Land Development Bank Finances 
Long term cooperative finance is provided through Land Development Banks 
(LDBs). These banks have passed through three distinct stages of development. The period 
between 1929 and 1954 represented the first stage when these banks were termed as land 
mortgage banks (LMBs). The major objective of LMBs during this stage was to rescue the 
farmers out of the clutches of private money lenders. The second stage began when in view of 
the recommendations of the All India Rural Survey Committee (1951-54) these banks started 
concentrating on extending long term finances for productive purposes in the farm sector with 
the aim of meeting the objective of planned development envisaged under the first Five Year 
Plan initiated in 1951 (Kumar and Dixit, 1998). The beginning of third stage was marked 
when in the light of the recommendations of Committee to Review Arrangements for 
Institutional Credit for Agriculture and Rural Development (CRAFICARD) in 1980 the 
LDBs expanded their lending operations by extending credit for non-land based and for non 
agricultural activities; and at the latter stage their activities also encompassed finances for non 
farm sectors. During this stage, these LDBs were termed as Cooperative Agriculture and 
Rural Development Banks (CARDBs). Of late, the loans of LDBs are extended not only for 
land-based productive activities, viz., minor irrigation, farm mechanization, plantation and 
land development but also for several other activities, which are, in general, subsidiary to 
agriculture like poultry, dairy, piggery, sheep rearing, fishery, sericulture, etc. (Kumar and 
Dixit, 1998). The non-farm sector encompass loans to agricultural labourers, rural artisans 
and small rural enterprises. Thus, the coverage of non-farm sectors and finances for non-land 
based purposes have certainly broad-based the activities of LDBs in more recent times. 
 In general, the flow of finances through LDBs encompass activities relating to 
agricultural production sub-system (APS), agricultural input distribution sub-system (AIS), 
agricultural produce marketing and processing sub-system (AMPS), and also long-term 
finance to members of LDBs for the purpose of purchase of tractor and its accessories, minor 
irrigation, milch and draught animal purchase, etc. The loans to members of LDBs for long 
term purposes are provided against the mortgage of their lands. Although the overall 
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performance of LDBs in India is satisfactory, they still have to do a lot of catching up to 
improve the condition of rural India. The major problem crippling the functioning of LDBs is 
the mounting amount of overdues and their outstanding loans, which have grown 
dramatically in more recent times.7  
 In the state of Maharashtra, the loan advances of LDBs have not only declined 
sharply during the period of reform but also working capital of these banks fell marginally 
during this period (Table 9). The membership of LDBs of Maharashtra has also grown at 
slower rate during the period between 1991 and 2000 as against the period between 1981 and 
2000. Even the recovery of loans and share capital base of LDBs have weakened during the 
reform period. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the outstanding loans of LDBs in 
Maharashtra have grown at slower pace during the period between 1991 and 2000 as against 
the period between 1981 and 2000 (Table 9). 
Table 9: Progress of Maharashtra State Cooperative Land Development Banks (LDBs) 
                                                                                (Amount in lakh Rupees; Membership in thousands) 
Period Membership Share 
Capital 
Owned 
Funds 
Borrow-
ings 
Working 
Capital 
Loan 
Advances 
Loans 
Recovered 
Loans 
Outstanding 
TE 1985 827 3743 7173 31182 44405 5651 2710 30627 
TE 1990 926 4531 11922 48045 66685 8932 3846 49245 
TE 1995 1111 7184 14766 68076 107311 13668 6089 82328 
TE 2000 1189 9752 54633 109438 144262 4875 8641 99690 
CGR (%) 
- 1981-00 
- 1991-00 
 
2.79* 
1.65* 
 
9.34* 
7.07* 
 
13.18* 
38.61* 
 
9.38* 
8.79* 
 
6.07* 
-0.27 
 
0.54 
-18.53 
 
7.75* 
6.83* 
 
9.21* 
5.64* 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from various issues of ‘Co-operative Movement at  
             a Glance in Maharashtra, Office of the Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of Co- 
             operative Societies, Maharashtra State, Pune 
 
 In order to tackle the problem of overdue of LDBs, certain suggestions have been 
extended by Kumar and Dixit (1998), which mainly revolve around creation of greater 
coordination among ST, MT and LT loans and streamlining the operations of LDBs, checking 
the diversion and misuse of LDB’s credit, effective supervision of loan product, 
strengthening the share capital base, and mobilizing deposits and debentures through more 
innovative deposits and debenture schemes. Another important suggestion in this context is in 
favour of launching intensive membership drive with a view to increase the coverage of these 
long term financial institutions. Some of the agricultural and rural development banks 
(ARDBs), popularly known as LDBs, have already taken initiatives in these directions. 
Micro Credit Innovations 
It has been noticed that despite vast expansion of banking network in India, a 
significant section of rural poor continue to remain outside the folds of traditional 
institutional finance. The dependency of this section of rural population is more on informal 
sources due mainly to ready and quick disbursal of credit. In fact, a very puzzling 
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characteristic of the Indian rural credit market is the thriving and simultaneous co-existence 
of the formal and the informal sectors. Lenders, in the formal sector, constitute credit 
institutions managed or regulated by the Government, whereas, the informal credit sources 
generally include professional money-lenders, relatives and friends, traders and landlords. In 
many parts of the country, the informal sector of credit is more dominant than the formal 
sector (Gill, 2000). This is also corroborated from the findings of the All India Debt and 
Investment Survey, 1992 which shows the share of informal sector in rural debt to be as high 
as 36 per cent. 
 Thus, in the midst of apparent inadequacies of formal financial institutions and their 
failure to serve and protect the interest of rural poor despite their phenomenal outreach, an 
informal segment comprising of small groups of rural poor began to mobilize capital and 
savings of their members and used these resources among their members on a micro scale. 
These groups were termed as Self Help Groups (SHGs). The lending procedures of these 
groups were not only simple but also effective due to small amount of loans involved in the 
process. Since the concept of SHGs was relatively new, NABARD undertook the task of 
studying the functioning of SHGs in India as well as in other countries. In this sequel, in 
1988-89, NABARD had made an attempt to conduct a survey of 43 non-government 
organizations (NGOs) spread over 11 states in India. The objectives of this survey were not 
only to study the functioning of SHGs but also to find out possibilities of linking bank credit 
with SHGs with a view to mobilize rural savings and improve the delivery of credit to the 
poor (NABARD, 1995). Findings of this investigation encouraged NABARD to launch a 
pilot project in 1991-92 which involved linkages between banks and SHGs.8 The SHG-bank 
linkage programme got a real boost when, in April 1996, RBI had recommended the banks 
that lending to the SHGs should be considered as an additional segment under priority sector 
lending. Thus, in view of this recommendation, lending to SHGs was integrated with the 
mainstream credit operations of the banks. The NABARD has been propagating, promoting 
and financing the SHG-Bank Linkage programme since 1992 (NABARD, 1998).   
The SHG Linkage programme received wider acceptability during 1997-98 when 30 
commercial banks, 101 Regional Rural Banks, 17 co-operative banks and 265 NGOs spread 
over 19 states and two Union Territories had participated in such a linkage programme. The 
main objective of the NGOs was to promote and nurture SHGs and act either as facilitators or 
both facilitators and intermediaries in effecting linkages between SHGs and banks. The 
progress of SHG-Bank Linkage programme has been quite impressive over the past few 
years. The information on progress under SHG-Bank Linkage Programme encompassing the 
period between 1992-93 and 1999-2000 is provided in Table 10. 
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 Table 10: Progress of SHG-Bank Linkage Programme in India    
                                                                                                     (Amount in Crore Rs.) 
Year 
No. of 
SHGs 
Linked 
Cumulativ
e 
% age of 
Women 
Groups 
No. of 
Participating 
Banks 
No. of 
States/Uts 
No. of 
Districts 
Covered 
Cumulative 
Bank Loan 
Cumulative 
Refinance 
1992-93 255 255 NA NA NA NA 0.29 0.27 
1993-94 356 620 NA NA NA NA 0.65 0.46 
1994-95 1,502 2,122 NA NA NA NA 2.45 2.29 
1995-96 2,635 4,757 NA NA NA NA 6.06 5.66 
1996-97 3,841 8,598 76 120 20 NA 11.84 10.65 
1997-98 5,719 14,317 78 150 21 221 23.76 21.38 
1998-99 18,678 32,995 84 202 24 280 57.07 52.06 
1999-
2000 
81,780 1,14,775 85 266 24 362 192.98 150.13 
Source: Official records of NABARD, Pune. 
 
With the inclusion of SHG linkage as a normal lending activity of the banks under 
priority sector from 1996-97, the approach of SHGs as a mechanism for socio-economic 
development/ empowerment of the rural poor has gained wider recognition and importance. 
The progress has been gathering momentum due mainly to the cost effectiveness of the SHG 
channel to reach the poor segment of the rural population. 
In the state of Maharashtra, the number of SHGs linked with bank credit have grown 
significantly over the past five years. This could be witnessed from Tables 11 and 12 which 
clearly show the strength of SHGs linked with bank credit to grow from as low as 424 as on 
March 1997 to as high as 11,148 as on June 2001. Initially, only 11 districts of Maharashtra 
were covered under the SHG-Bank linkage programme. However, in due course of time, 
more and more districts were covered under the folds of this programme. At present, all the 
33 districts of Maharashtra are covered under the SHG-Bank linkage programme. The region 
that has shown phenomenal growth in the numerical strength of SHGs linked with bank credit 
is seen to be Vidarbha (Table 3.12). Western Maharashtra and to some extent Marathwada 
have also shown significant increases in the numerical strength of SHGs over the past five 
years. However, so far as Konkan region is concerned, linking of SHGs with bank credit has 
been a more recent phenomenon. Due to initiation of SHG-Bank linkage programme, there 
have been perceptible and wholesome changes in the living standards of the members of 
SHGs, especially in terms of their ownership of assets, savings and borrowing capacity, 
income generation activities and levels of income. 
Table 11: Progress of SHG-Bank Linkage Programme in Maharashtra (Amount in Lakh Rs.) 
Cumulative Position As On           
Sr. 
No. 
Particulars 
March 1997 March 1998 March 1999 March 2000 
1. No. of SHGs Linked 424 872 1,969 4,959 
2. Bank Loan 76.9 154.9 378.98 929.89 
3. Refinance 66.27 138.66 360.14 904.44 
4. No. of Districts Covered 11 17 20 29 
Source: Official records of NABARD, Pune. 
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Table 12: Region-wise Number of SHGs Linked with Bank Credit in Maharashtra  
Regions March 1997 
March 
1998 
March 
1999 
March 
2000 
March 
2001 
June 
2001 
Cumulative 
Total 
Western Maharashtra 183 172 188 687 649 136 2015 
Vidarbha 204 226 764 1618 3965 332 7109 
Marathwada 37 48 131 588 500 172 1476 
Konkan - 2 14 97 395 40 548 
           Total 424 448 1097 2990 5509 680 11148 
Source: Official records of NABARD, Pune. 
 
As per the speech of the Hon’ble Union Minister of Finance, about 1,00,000 SHGs 
were targeted to be promoted in India during the year 2000-01 (NABARD Annual Report, 
2000-01). In view of this target, the NABARD had set its mission to link a minimum of 5,000  
SHGs with bank credit in the state of Maharashtra during the year 2000-01. The NABARD 
has also drawn a medium-term strategic plan to ensure linkage of at least 55,000 SHGs with 
bank credit by the end of 2004. In order to accelerate the pace of SHG-Bank linkage 
programme, the NABARD has also devised district-specific and location-specific strategies 
in view of available potential, resources and prevailing constraints. Now, more emphasis is 
placed on those aspects such as involving NGOs as active partners in the formation of SHGs, 
capacity building of the members of SHGs or their group leaders, and sensitization of 
bankers. Further, the NABARD has also taken an initiative to create ‘Micro-Finance 
Development Foundation’(MFDF). The MFDF is expected to provide financial, technical and 
other assistance for experimenting with various models encompassing credit delivery 
innovations. The Foundation will also help NABARD to link SHGs with bank credit, besides 
providing capacity building support to NGOs and other institutions engaged in such 
programmes. Under MFDF, provisions are also made to utilize funds for conducting studies 
and undertake research relating to micro-finance, dissemination of information amongst the 
various players in the system, etc. The Foundation also includes mobilization of monetary 
and other requisite resources from various organizations with a view to develop expertise in 
micro finance. It is expected that with the increasing involvement of banking system as well 
as NGOs the micro-credit movement will get further fillip in the years to come. 
Rejuvenation of RFIs 
The RFIs of India are reported to show a steady increase in their outstanding loans all 
through the period between 1980 and 1997 (Gulati and Bathla, 2002). High transaction cost 
for funds and lower financial margins are the two major factors behind non-payment of rural 
loans and accumulation of overdues of RFIs in India. However, the estimates relating to 
various RFIs of Maharashtra show a slower growth in their outstanding loans (OL), overdue 
from direct advances (DA) and bad debt in agriculture during the period between 1991and 
1997 as against the period between 1980 and 1990 (Appendix 1). At the same time, the 
proportion of overdue to OL of RFIs of Maharashtra has grown at much faster rate during the 
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reform period as against the pre-economic reform period. The reform period also shows 
increasingly high growth of Maharashtra’s share in total overdue and bad debt in agriculture 
of RFIs in India. 
The slower growth in institutional finances through commercial banks, credit 
cooperatives, RRBs and LDBs, particularly during the decade of 1991-2000, is mainly due to 
adverse environment created by the financial sector reforms. As pointed out by Mujumdar 
(1999), the new policy regime of financial sector reforms has grossly neglected the rural 
credit delivery system. Due to unfavourable policy framework, the entire rural credit delivery 
system encompassing rural branches of commercial banks, cooperative credit institutions and 
RRBs is reduced to a moribund state (Mujumdar, 2001). Mujumdar (1996) while lauding the 
financial sector reforms also felt that the exaggerated importance given to developing 
institutions has resulted in “putting the core issues of the financial system, like improving the 
rural credit delivery system, on the back- burner”. He criticized the blind dependency on 
market forces, irrespective of their macro-economic implications. Mujumdar (2001) has also 
shown concern for the shrinking flow of financial resources to agriculture, both in terms of 
investment and working capital. In fact, the public investment in agriculture is reported to be 
declining (Thamarajakshi, 1999). Between 1992 and 1997, only 8 per cent of the total public 
investment went to agriculture, and the actual investment in this sector fell about 40 per cent 
short of the planned level.  
High transaction costs and poor repayment performance are the twin root causes of 
the moribund state of rural credit delivery system (Mujumdar, 2001). With a view to revive 
the agricultural credit delivery system, there is need to adopt innovative approaches like 
linking of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) with 
mainstream financial institutions. Such linkages are reported to have not only reduced 
transaction costs but also ensured better repayment performance. One of the recent studies 
conducted in Maharashtra has shown cent per cent recovery of loans through SHGs despite 
having excessively high rates of interest (24-36 per cent per annum) on their loan advances 
(Kshirsagar and Shah, 2002). 
One of the recent welcome developments in rural credit has been the establishment of 
the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) instituted by NABARD with the objective 
of advancing loans to state governments and state-owned corporations for hastening ongoing 
projects, mainly those related to medium and minor irrigation, soil conservation, watershed 
management, etc (Mujumdar, 1998). However, it is also being conceded by Mujumdar (2001) 
that the utilization of this fund is dismal at only 30 per cent.  One of the further disquieting 
features of RFIs in Maharashtra has been the high proportion of NPAs to total assets, 
particularly of RRBs and SCARDBs, which are estimated to hover around 36-48 per cent 
 23
during the mid-to late nineties. One of the reasons for such high incidence of NPAs of RFIs 
has been the familiar practice of debt forgiveness, which eroded repayment and allowed 
defaulters to scot free with no deterrent reprimand. Political interference in issues of prudent 
fiscal management has got a lot to do with this unfortunate scenario. 
Conclusion 
 The new generation lending institutions like SHGs show high rate of recovery despite 
excessively high rates of interest on their loan advances. They also show lower transaction 
cost as compared to other lending institutions. This makes it necessary for credit cooperatives 
and commercial banks to study the mechanism of new generation lending institutions in terms 
of their pattern of loan recovery and interest rate structure. The in-house studies conducted 
earlier have clearly shown lower transaction costs and higher recovery performance of SHGs 
(Gulati and Bathla, 2002). These groups are also reported to have favourably impacted the 
social and economic status of their members. Further, the RFIs of Maharashtra are also seen 
to be beset with high levels of NPAs or overdues. There is, therefore, a need to take more 
stringent and cohesive measures for recovery of loans from chronic and heavy defaulters. In 
brief, in order to rejuvenate rural credit delivery system, the twin problems facing the system, 
viz., high transaction costs and poor repayment performance, need to be tackled with more 
fiscal jurisprudence reserving exemplary punishment for willful defaults, especially by large 
farmers. In fact, insofar as the rural credit delivery system is concerned, the focus should be 
on strategies that are required for tackling issues such as sustainability and viability, 
operational efficiency, recovery performance, small farmer coverage and balanced sectoral 
development (Puhazhendhi and Jayaraman, 1999). 
 
Notes 
1. Lack of recovery of loan results into overdues. Overdues are defined as loans and 
interest thereon not repaid on due dates. The financial health of banking business 
heavily depends on recovery of loans. Of the total amount of loan due at different 
points of time, some of it is recoverable and some irrecoverable and the latter often 
turns into bad debt or defaults (Gulati and Bathla, 2002). 
 
2. As per M. Narasimham (RBI 1991) Committee, the non performing assets (NPAs) 
are those loan advances which are marked with non payment of interest or repayment 
of principal or both for a period of two quarters or more during the year ending. An 
amount is considered as ‘post due’ if it is unpaid for 30 days beyond due date. The 
NPAs are broadly classified as sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets. 
 
3. In broader terms, the major reforms/steps initiated during the period from 1991/ 92 to 
1997/98 in Cooperative Credit Sector are seen to revolve around : (a) relaxation in 
branch expansion policy, (b) liberalization and relaxation in Credit Authorization 
Scheme, (c) permission to SCBs to introduce STOCKINVEST and Currency Chest 
Branches, (d) ‘some additional’ scheme to SCBs under National Level Consortium 
arrangement for financing, (e) a policy decision to permit SCBs on case by case to 
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subscribe to the Public Sector Bonds, (f) assistance to SCBs from Cooperative 
Development Fund by NABARD to ensure proper Management Information System 
and to conduct research studies, (g) deregulated interest rates on advances and 
deposits by SCBs / DCBs, (h) preparation of Development Action Plans and entering 
into MOUs at the instance of NABARD, (i) applicability of Prudential norms to 
SCBs / DCCBs , and (j) relaxation in extending finance to individuals with a view to 
provide avenues for broader  deployment of the resources. 
 
4. The SLBC is a recognized forum and it not only coordinates the activities of Bankers, 
NABARD, various departments of the state Government, development agencies, 
NGOs, etc. but also ensures effective implementation of various schemes relating to 
flow of credit to poverty alleviation programmes, besides helping to achieve the 
targets envisaged in the ACP. The members of this forum have a unique system of 
evaluating their own performance. The activities of the convener of SLBC not only 
encompass collection of meaningful performance related data but also facilitation of 
meaningful discussion on important issues and arriving at a consensus for effective 
implementation of various development programmes, besides ensuring flow of credit, 
in general, to different sub-sectors of the economy. The forum regularly meets and 
interacts with a view to ensure effective discharge of their respective role in terms of 
achieving the objectives envisaged in the State Credit Plan. This also helps in 
ensuring timely credit flows towards various programme aimed at employment 
generation. 
 
5. In terms of directed credit, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stipulated several 
targets for Public Sector Banks (PSBs). These encompass a minimum of: (a) 40 per 
cent of net bank credit to priority sectors, (b) 18 per cent of total advances to 
agriculture, (c) 10 per cent of total advances to weaker sections, (d) one per cent of 
net bank credit under differential rate of interest (DRI) scheme, and (e) maintenance 
of a 60 per cent of a credit-deposit ratio. Among these targets, (b) and (c) are the two 
sub targets of (a), i.e., 18 per cent of net bank credit to agriculture and 10 per cent to 
weaker sections with an overall 40 per cent of net bank credit to priority sectors. 
 
6. The most important among these committees were Kelkar Committee, Agricultural 
Credit Review Committee (ACRC) under the Chairmanship of Prof. A.M. Khusro 
(1989), Committee on Financial System (1992) under the Chairmanship of Shri M. 
Narasimham, and Committee on Restructuring of RRBs (1994) under the 
Chairmanship of Dr. C. Bhandari. 
 
7. The overdues of Primary Cooperative Agriculture Rural Development Banks 
(PCARDBs) at all-India level is reported to have grown from Rs.196.43 crores in 
1987 to Rs.435.20 crores in 1995 (Kumar and Dixit, 1998). Earlier, while reviewing 
the report of Agricultural Credit Review Committee, Shivamaggi (1993) had also 
cited overdue as the major problem facing the LDBs. This is despite the fact that the 
loans extended by LDBs not only help in creating productive assets but also in terms 
of generating adequate incremental income to the farmers. 
 
8. The linkage between banks and SHGs is a mechanism for channeling credit to the 
poor on a sustained basis. There are numerous potential advantages involved in the 
linkages between banks and SHGs with NGOs acting as facilitators or financial 
intermediaries. From the banks point of view, the advantages of linkage approach 
between banks and SHGs include reduction in transaction cost, mobilization of small 
savings, assured and timely repayment of loan leading to faster recycling of funds, 
opportunity for expansion of business and coverage of poor clientele, and prospects 
of future quality clients. In this process, NGOs not only act as bridge between banks 
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and the poor and perform their role as financial intermediaries in unbanked and 
backward areas but they are also propagators of innovative credit delivery 
approaches. The efforts of NGOs develop thrift habit among the poor and provide 
them access to large quantity of finance. The efforts of NGOs in linking banks with 
SHGs also provide freedom, equality, self-reliance and empowerment among the 
members, besides making them available consumption/ production credit at their 
door-steps. This in turn helps the members of SHGs to have a window for access to 
better technology and upgradation of their skills.  The NGOs also help SHGs to have 
access to various promotional assistance, besides scaling up of their operations. 
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Appendix 1: Some Broad Performance Indicators of Rural Financial Institutions (RFIs) of  
              Maharashtra  vis-à-vis All-India                                                         (in Crore Rupees)         
                                                                                 
Outstanding Loan (OL) Overdue from DA Overdue as % of OL  Bad Debt in Agriculture Period Mah. India Share Mah. India Share Mah.  India Mah. India Share 
TE 1982 842.12 7326.36 11.49 294.99 2157.95 13.74 35.65 29.72 46.97 244.44 19.30 
TE 1990 3084.77 25940.29 11.85 812.76 6712.71 12.03 26.13 25.65 112.01 771.98 14.50 
TE 1997 3521.57 34579.59 10.67 1536.03 8912.23 17.10 44.56 26.36 185.84 1054.68 17.54 
CGR (%) 
- 1980-90 
- 1991-97 
- 1980-97 
 
16.12* 
-1.02 
10.51* 
 
15.21* 
2.01 
10.75* 
 
0.91 
-2.97 
-0.22 
 
13.47* 
9.99 
11.75* 
 
14.22* 
1.00 
10.13* 
 
-2.97 
7.92* 
1.45 
 
-3.92* 
10.12* 
1.11 
 
-1.89* 
-0.99 
-0.56 
 
11.78* 
4.91 
10.12* 
 
15.65* 
-2.11 
10.83* 
 
-3.11* 
7.17* 
-0.65 
Source: Computations are based on figures obtained from:  Gulati, Ashok and Seema Barhla (2002),   
             ‘Institutional Credit to Indian Agriculture: Defaults  and Policy Options’, Occasional Paper –  
              23, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural  Development, Mumbai 
Notes:  CGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate; DA = Direct Advances 
 
 
